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Abstract
Empirical studies document di®erences in ¯rms' response to the introduc-
tion of various labor market policies. In particular, large and mature ¯rms tend
to participate more actively in targeted employment subsidy programs (under
which ¯rms receive subsidies for hiring disadvantaged workers). This paper o®ers
an explanation for this phenomenon and argues that it might have important
consequences for policy making.
Namely, such behavior of ¯rms may indicate that large and mature ¯rms
bene¯t from the introduction of a new subsidy program, while small and young
¯rms incur indirect costs. In this case, the policy implicitly redistributes pro¯t
from young to mature ¯rms and may discourage startups if the entry into the
industry is competitive. The resulting decrease in the number of operating ¯rms is
likely to have a signi¯cant impact on the policy's outcomes. These e®ects become
more pronounced as heterogeneity between young and mature ¯rms increases.
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11 Introduction
In economies with substantial ¯rm heterogeneity, some ¯rms may incur losses while
others may bene¯t as a result of a new labor market policy introduced by the govern-
ment. In other words, the policy may redistribute pro¯ts among di®erent groups of
¯rms. This paper argues that such redistribution may have important implications for
policymaking if (i) entry into the industry is competitive and (ii) there are substantial
di®erences in size or productivity between young and mature ¯rms. In particular, if
mature ¯rms are the ones who, for some reason, bene¯t from the introduction of a labor
market policy, the expected lifetime pro¯t of entrants may decrease, thereby discour-
aging start-ups and reducing the number of operating ¯rms. Naturally, the resulting
decline in the size of the production sector might have important implications for policy
analysis.
For example, a government may introduce an employment subsidy program aimed
at increasing an economy's total employment level. While designing this program, a
policymaker may believe that either the policy would have no impact on the number of
¯rms operating in the economy or that it would a®ect entrants as much as mature ¯rms.
Relying on these assumptions, the policymaker would expect that the new subsidy
program would reduce the economy's unemployment level. However, this paper presents
a theory and a numerical example illustrating that the opposite may happen after the
policy is implemented, due to the adverse e®ect on total employment caused by a
massive exit of ¯rms.
This study focuses on the e®ects of the employment subsidies paid to ¯rms hiring
workers with particular characteristics (e.g., having relatively low skills, being long
term unemployed). Even though such policy is primarily targeted to a special group of
workers, it also implicitly favors those ¯rms who either create relatively more jobs for
the workers from the targeted group or appear to be more responsive to a decrease in
these workers' labor cost.
Several versions of such targeted employment subsidy programs have been used by
policymakers in di®erent countries during the last decade.1 Availability of data about
the participants in these subsidy programs stimulated a large number of empirical stud-
ies evaluating their outcomes. Some of these works focus on the labor market perspec-
tives of the targeted group of workers, others study displacement e®ects and potential
deadweight losses, several more focus on the subsidies' e®ects on aggregate employment
in a particular sector.2 At the same time, there is no unanimous agreement regarding
1Examples of such policies include Targeted Job Tax Credit in the U.S., New Deal in Britain,
various wage subsidies in Canada and Sweden, etc.
2See, for example, Bishop and Montgomery (1986), Hollenbeck and Willke (1991), Katz (1996),
Bell, Blundell and Van Reen (1999), Blundell and Meghir (2001), Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstrom
(2001), Martin and Grebb (2001), Sianesi (2001) and many others.
2the success of these subsidy programs because empirical evidence is quite controversial
and depends on the program's setup, its scale, size of the targeted group and many
other factors. In contributing to the existing literature, this paper suggests that the
heterogeneity between young and mature ¯rms might serve as a potential explanatory
variable in the empirical analysis evaluating the targeted employment subsidy programs.
The theory developed in this study predicts that, in competitive industries, the bigger
the di®erences between young and mature ¯rms, the more likely it is that the subsidy
program will not be successful.
Despite much attention that the existing theoretical literature has paid to under-
standing the impacts of various labor market policies and identifying the important
mechanisms responsible for the policies' outcomes, there has not been, to my knowl-
edge, any study focusing primarily on the role of between-¯rm redistribution driven by
the introduction of a new policy. A possible reason for such a gap in the literature
is that in many cases the assumptions used in theoretical models do not allow for the
full accounting of the relationship between this redistribution e®ect and the number of
¯rms operating in the economy. For example, some studies explicitly assume that the
number of ¯rms in the industry is ¯xed at an exogenously given level and cannot change
in response to the introduction of a new policy.3 Another class of models allows for the
pinning down of the number of ¯rms endogenously, but relies on the assumption that
the entrants are no di®erent from the mature ¯rms, thereby neglecting the potential
e®ect that redistribution of pro¯ts among ¯rms with di®erent characteristics may have
on the number of ¯rms in the economy.4
A di®erent approach is taken in the work by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), in
which the impacts of ¯ring taxes are analyzed in the context of an industry dynamics
framework with heterogeneous ¯rms and endogenous entry and exit °ows. Their paper
draws attention to the welfare implications of the ¯ring taxation program as well as
its impact on the productivity of entering and surviving ¯rms. At the same time, it
neither describes the redistributionary e®ects of the policy nor points out their potential
importance for policy analysis. That is why in the current paper I modify Hopenhayn
and Rogerson's (1993) framework and use it to study the response of the economy to
the introduction of a targeted employment subsidy program. The goal of this exercise
is to identify the role of between-¯rm redistribution in explaining some of the policy's
outcomes.
The theoretical framework developed in this paper is based on a simple model of
industry equilibrium with heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market. Firms
di®er in their size and age, which are positively related to each other. As in Hopenhayn
(1992), entry into the industry is competitive, so in the equilibrium the value of entrants,
3See, for example Alvarez and Veracierto (2000), Richardson (1997), etc.
4In Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) the number of vacancies is determined endogenously, but it is
assumed that entrants draw a productivity shock from the same distribution as older ¯rms do.
3measured as their expected discounted life-time °ow of pro¯t, is equal to the cost of
starting a new enterprize. Workers have di®erent skills, and low-skilled workers ought to
receive additional training before starting their job. For this reason, in the equilibrium
low-skilled workers receive lower wage and have higher unemployment rates than high-
skilled workers do.
Firms incur a cost for training unskilled employees. Empirical evidence suggests
that larger ¯rms tend to provide more training per employed worker5 as well as to
participate more actively in the subsidy programs.6 These implications endogenously
arise in the model if the training cost function is convex in the fraction of ¯rms' unskilled
employees. Intuitively, if ¯rms' production technology is concave, the convexity of the
training cost is easily derived from the assumption that skilled workers have to spend
some of their working time training their unskilled colleagues rather than producing.
In reality, ¯rms report that much of the training they provide is indeed done in this
way.7
Another implication of the training cost's convexity explains why the government
might consider employment subsidies for hiring unskilled workers as a good policy
instrument aimed at increasing total employment. The model predicts that, in response
to a decrease in the wage of unskilled workers, every operating ¯rm not only decides to
hire more unskilled employees, but also creates more jobs for skilled workers. Intuitively,
if a ¯rm hires more employees requiring additional training, it must also hire more
workers, who are able to provide training services, otherwise training all new unskilled
hires becomes too expensive. Such complementarity in the workers' types gives the hope
that subsidizing unskilled workers would stimulate demand for both types of labor and,
consequently, would raise aggregate employment.
The above argument would be correct if the number of ¯rms in the economy were
not a®ected by the subsidy program. However, if the number of operating ¯rms is
determined endogenously, the subsidy could induce some ¯rms to exit and the total
unemployment could rise. For example, a calibrated numerical exercise shows that
if 30% of unskilled workers' wages are subsidized by the government, the aggregate
unemployment rate falls from 6% to 3:4% in an economy with a constant number of
¯rms. On the other hand, the same subsidy program increases unemployment from 6%
to 6:7% if the number of ¯rms is determined endogenously.
In general, exit of ¯rms from the economy could occur for two reasons: either be-
cause the subsidy program redistributes pro¯t from entrants to mature ¯rms or because
the subsidy expenditures are ¯nanced by a distortionary tax. That is why, in order to
5For instance, see the data from the 1995 Survey of Employer-Provided Training collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Sept95).
6For evidence, see Bishop and Montgomery (1986).
7In the Sept95 survey, ¯rms report that over 70 percent of training is usually delivered through
informal instructions rather than o±cially organized classes.
4illustrate the importance of the former redistributionary e®ect, the second part of the
numerical exercise compares the calibrated benchmark economy, in which entrants are
68% smaller than incumbent ¯rms, with the economy where the entrants are only 41%
smaller than the incumbents. In the absence of subsidies, the equilibrium allocations in
the two economies are identical. However, if the same subsidy program is implemented
in both economies, fewer ¯rms exit from the economy with relatively large entrants,
and, therefore, the resulting equilibrium unemployment rate is higher in the economy
with more heterogeneity between young and mature ¯rms. In particular, the 30% sub-
sidy, which induces the unemployment rate to rise to 6:7% in the benchmark economy,
reduces unemployment to 4:7% in the modi¯ed economy with larger entrants.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes ¯rms' deci-
sion in a partial equilibrium framework, explains in details why and how the redistri-
bution e®ect may occur and derives the aggregate economy's demand for both types of
labor. Section 3 describes how the equilibrium allocation in the economy is determined
and argues that accounting for endogeneity of the number of ¯rms is likely to have
an important e®ect. Section 4 describes the calibration technique and summarizes the
results of numerical policy experiments. Section 5 outlines the main ¯ndings of the
paper and comments on some of the assumptions made in the theoretical model.
2 Firms' Hiring Decision
This section characterizes the employment decision of ¯rms in a partial equilibrium
framework. It shows that, under the assumption of a convex training cost, large ¯rms,
as compared to the small ones, hire more unskilled labor, incur higher training expendi-
tures and, correspondingly, bene¯t more from the introduction of targeted employment
subsidies. This is done in two steps. First, I describe the hiring policies of ¯rms in a
static setup and analyze the e®ects of employment subsidies on one-period ¯rms' prof-
its. Then I show that static results can be extended to a dynamic setting. The last part
of this Section describes the aggregate ¯rm dynamics, derives the economy's demand
for both types of labor and discusses why the introduction of targeted employment
subsidies may a®ect the total number of ¯rms in the economy.
2.1 The e®ect of targeted employment subsidies on ¯rms' cur-
rent pro¯t
Consider an economy in which there are two types of workers, skilled and unskilled.
Only skilled employees can be productively working in a ¯rm. That is why if a ¯rm hires
unskilled workers it must provide them with a certain amount of training. Training is
costly. Firms' training cost rises with the number nl of unskilled hires and falls with
5the amount nh of skilled employees. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the
training cost can be represented as a function of the fraction of unskilled to skilled












where A > 0 and ° > 0 for all nh > 0 and nl > 0. As it is shown later, the assumption
of convexity allows us to obtain a positive relationship between the ¯rm size and the
amount of training provided by the ¯rm, which is observed in the data.8
Given this cost function and the wages wh and wl paid to skilled and unskilled
workers respectively, every ¯rm decides how many employees of each type it wants to
hire. The hiring decision is made at the very beginning of the period, then training is
provided for unskilled workers, and after that production takes place. Since unskilled
workers become identical to skilled employees after the former receive necessary training,
¯rms' output can be expressed as a function of total employment l = nh + nl. The
production technology is given by sf(l) = l®, where ® 2 (0;1) and s 2 [0;s] is a ¯rm
productivity level.9 Productivity is random and follows the Markov process with the
conditional distribution given by Q(s0js).
For simplicity, it is assumed that ¯rms face no ¯xed production cost, thus instanta-
neous pro¯t of a ¯rm having productivity shock s and hiring nh and nl workers of each
type is given by
¼(s;nh;nl;wh;wl) = sf(nh + nl) ¡ whnh ¡ wlnl ¡ c(nl=nh):
Note that, due to the absence of a ¯xed cost, a ¯rm hiring no workers produces no
output and pays no cost, so its pro¯t is equal to zero, ¼(s;0;0) = 0.
The optimal hiring policies n¤
h(s;wh;wl) and n¤






The following Lemma describes the properties of the ¯rms' hiring decision.
8In a more general case, these properties of the cost function c(nh;nl) could be derived endogenously
under the assumption that skilled employees have to spend some of their working time training their
unskilled colleagues. Assuming that ¸ units of time are required to train one worker, one can easily
show that the endogenous cost of hiring arising in this environment satis¯es the following conditions
for some ¸ < 1 and all ¸ > ¸: e c1(nh;nl) < 0, e c2(nh;nl) > 0, e c11(nh;nl) > 0, e c12(nh;nl) < 0,
and e c22(nh;nl) > 0. It is straightforward to verify that similar properties hold for the cost function
determined by (1).
9In general, most of the paper's results hold if certain conditions are imposed on the curvature on
the production function f(l) and on the degree of convexity of the training cost function (° should be
large enough). However, adopting the functional form f(l) = l® allows us to derive simple su±cient
conditions for existence and uniqueness of ¯rms' decision and thus turns out to be very handy.
6Lemma 1 If f(l) = l®, the training cost function c(¢) is given by (1) and wh > wl.
Assume also that the following condition is satis¯ed:








(i) for every s > 0, there exists a unique bundle of hiring policies n¤
h(s;wh;wl) > 0
and n¤
l(s;wh;wl) > 0, which solves (2);
(ii) total employment l¤(s;wh;wl) = n¤
h(s;wh;wl)+n¤
l(s;wh;wl) as well as the fraction
of unskilled employees n¤
l(s;wh;wl)=l¤(s;wh;wl) are increasing in ¯rms' produc-
tivity level s.
(iii) j@¼¤(s;wh;wl)=@wlj is increasing in s, i.e., the instantaneous pro¯t of more pro-
ductive ¯rms is more sensitive to the changes in the wage of unskilled workers;
(iv) lims!0
¼¤(s;wh;wl¡¢)
¼¤(s;wh;wl) = 1 for all ¢ > 0.
The proofs of this Lemma and of all the following results are given in the Appendix in
the end of the paper.
The ¯rst statement of the above Lemma simply says that the maximization problem
(2) always has a unique solution. The second statement allows for a comparison of the
predictions of the model with the data. It states that the ¯rms with higher productivity
shocks hire more workers, therefore they will be further referred to as large ¯rms. The
second statement also claims that the relative quantity of unskilled employees is higher
in large ¯rms. Knowing this, it is straightforward to see that the fraction of labor cost
spent on the salary of unskilled workers as well as expenditures on training ¯rms' own
employees are higher in larger ¯rms. This is where the convexity of the training cost
function plays its role: given the speci¯cation of the model, it would be hard to derive
these regularities that are observed in the data without this assumption.
Intuitively, this result can be explained by comparing the marginal bene¯t and
the marginal cost arising due to an increase in the fraction nl=l of a ¯rm's unskilled
employees. Due to lower wage cost, the ¯rm's total bene¯t is proportionate to the
number of its unskilled employees (wh¡wl)nl. Thus the marginal bene¯t from increasing
the fraction of unskilled workers is proportionate to the total number of the ¯rm's
employees @((wh¡wl)nl)=@(nl=l) = (wh¡wl)l. At the same time, due to the convexity
of the training cost c(¢), the marginal cost, which is associated with the increase in the
fraction of unskilled workers, is increasing in nl=l. Therefore, those ¯rms which decide
to hire more workers will also demand relatively more unskilled employees in order to
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Figure 1: The e®ect of change in the unskilled workers' wage wl on ¯rms pro¯t as a
function of ¯rms' productivity level.
The third statement of Lemma 1 connects the preceding analysis with the e®ect of
\between-¯rm distribution" triggered by the introduction of a wage subsidy for hiring
unskilled workers. It says that as the wage of unskilled workers decreases (for example,
due to the introduction of targeted employment subsidies), the pro¯t of the large ¯rms
rises at a higher rate than the pro¯t of small ¯rms. Correspondingly, if this wage
reduction is ¯nanced by a proportionate pro¯t tax,10 the after-tax pro¯t decreases for
the small ¯rms and rises for the large ones after the subsidy is introduced.
For better exposition, Figure 1 illustrates the relative change in the pro¯t as a func-
tion of ¯rms' productivity that occurs if the wage of unskilled workers falls by 10 per
cent. The left panel plots the change in before-tax pro¯t, ¼¤(s;wh;(1¡µ)wl)=¼¤(s;wh;wl).
Note that, according to the last statement of Lemma 1, the wage reduction has very
little e®ect on the pro¯t of a small ¯rm. This happens because small ¯rms hire very few
unskilled workers. The right panel of Figure 1 plots the after-tax change in the pro¯t.
For every positive tax rate ¿ > 0, lims!0((1 ¡ ¿)¼¤(s;wh;(1 ¡ µ)wl)=¼¤(s;wh;wl)) < 1,
so all ¯rms with relatively low productivity levels (s < s¤) experience a decrease in
their instantaneous pro¯t, and those with s > s¤ bene¯t from the introduction of the
subsidy. Obviously, in this example the tax rate is chosen arbitrarily (¿ = 0:05). In
a general equilibrium framework, it is determined by a government budget constraint,
which is later de¯ned in Section 4.
Finally, condition (3) that appears in the statement of Lemma 1 imposes a lower
10It is easy to see that if the subsidy is ¯nanced by a payroll tax, or by a tax on the wage income of
skilled employees, the same redistribution e®ect occurs. In the latter case, it even becomes stronger
because an implicit increase in the relative labor cost of skilled employees works in the same direction
as a reduction of the wage of unskilled workers, thereby reinforcing the redistribution e®ect.
8bound on the curvature of the training cost function. This condition guarantees that
the second order conditions for the ¯rms' maximization problem are satis¯ed, stipulates
that the ¯rms' optimal choice is unique and also implies that a ¯rm's size increases as
the wage of unskilled workers falls. At the same time, condition (3) holds for a broad
range of parameter values. For example, if ® = 0:64 (which corresponds to a labor
share of output observed in the US data) and wl=wh = 0:66 (which is consistent with
the relative wages of workers with di®erent education), the parameter ° should exceed
0.26 in order to satisfy (3). A calibrated value of ° that is used in the numerical exercise
in Section 4 is higher that this lower bound (° ¼ 0:83).
2.2 The e®ect of targeted employment subsidies on ¯rms' life-
time value
This section characterizes the stay/exit decision of the ¯rms that have already entered
into the industry and argues that the introduction of a subsidy for unskilled employees,
¯nanced by a pro¯t tax, decreases the value of small ¯rms and increases the value of
large ones. The entry decision and its relation to aggregate dynamics are described in
the following section.
Assume that ¯rms decide whether to stay or exit before the realization of their
current productivity shock. If the outside opportunity is normalized to zero, the value
of the ¯rm that has decided to stay in the industry in the current period is given by








where r denotes a risk-free interest rate. Before characterizing the properties of V (s;wh;wl),
I make the following assumptions about the properties of the process of ¯rms' produc-
tivity shocks:
ASSUMPTION 1 (Continuity and monotonicity) Q(s0js) is continuous in both
s and s0; Q(¢js) is strictly decreasing in s.
Continuity implies that if V (s0;wh;wl) is a continuous function of s0 then
R
V (s0;wh;wl)dQ(s0js)
is also continuous in s. From monotonicity it follows that the integral in the right hand
side of equation (4) preserves the monotonicity of V (s0;wh;wl) with respect to s0.
ASSUMPTION 2 (Absorbing state) Q(0j0) = 1, i.e. s = 0 is an absorbing state.
In the modeled environment this assumption is necessary to generate positive °ows
of entry and exit. Due to the absence of a ¯xed production cost, the current pro¯t of
¯rms is nonnegative at any level of productivity shock. Correspondingly, the value of the
¯rm with zero productivity level would be positive if assumption 2 were not imposed
9(because even not operational ¯rms would have a positive probability of becoming
productive again in the future), and no exit would ever occur. The absence of a ¯xed
production cost is obviously a simplifying assumption but it allows for the abstraction
from the policy's impact on the average productivity in the industry, thus allowing us
to focus on the between-¯rms distributional e®ect.
In addition, Assumption 2 guarantees that the after-tax present value of expected
life-time pro¯t decreases for the ¯rms with su±ciently low productivity levels after the
targeted employment subsidy is introduced. If s = 0 were not an absorbing state, it
could happen that the value of small ¯rms would increase after the introduction of the
subsidy, given that the probability of getting high productivity in the future is large
enough. On the other hand, if low productivity shocks are su±ciently persistent (as it
is reported in the data), the results of Lemma 2 will still be valid even if Assumption
2 does not hold. In other words, neither of the two implications of Assumption 2 is
crucial for the validity of the main argument of the paper, but they both allow for the
conveying of the idea in a more illustrative way.
Lemma 2 If all assumptions of Lemma 1 hold and the process of ¯rms' productivity
shocks satis¯es Assumptions 1 and 2, then dynamic programming problem (4) has a
unique solution V (s;wh;wl), such that:
(i) V (s;wh;wl) is increasing and continuous in s, V (s;wh;wl) > 0 if and only if
s > 0;
(ii) j@V (s;wh;wl)=@wlj is increasing in s;
(iii) lims!0
V (s;wh;(1¡²)wl)
V (s;wh;wl) = 1 for all ² 2 (0;1);
(iv) for every ² 2 (0;1) and ¿ > 0, there exist such b s that V¿(s;wh;(1 ¡ ²)wl) <
V (s;wh;wl) for all s < b s, where










Lemma 2 establishes that the properties of the instantaneous pro¯t ¼¤(s;wh;wl) are
mapped into similar properties of the ¯rms' life-time value V (s;wh;wl), and only the
¯rms with su±ciently high productivity levels (s > b s) may bene¯t from the presence
of the targeted employment subsidies (conditional on the tax rate ¿ and wages wh and
wl being ¯xed).
In order to proceed with the de¯nitions of equilibrium, it is now necessary to describe
how the distribution of ¯rms' productivity levels evolves over time and how it relates to
10the distribution of entrants' productivity shocks and the number of entering ¯rms. This
mechanism is characterized in the following section and is similar to the formalization
of ¯rm dynamics in Hopenhayn (1993).
2.3 Aggregate Firm Dynamics
At the beginning of each period, before the individual productivity shocks are drawn, an
unlimited number of potential ¯rms face an option of entering into the industry. If a ¯rm
decides to enter, it receives a productivity shock from the distribution characterized by
c.d.f. G(s), s 2 [0;s]. Its future productivity shocks follow the Markov process Q(s0js)
described above. Opening up a ¯rm requires ¯xed cost ´, which should be paid before
the initial productivity shock is drawn.
If the markets are perfectly competitive, entry into the industry occurs as long as
the present value of expected life-time pro¯t for the entrants exceeds entry cost ´. No
¯rms are willing to enter if the following condition holds:
Z
V (s;wh;wl)dG(s) = ´: (6)
The above free entry condition determines the equilibrium number of ¯rms entering into
the industry every period. It is balanced through the mechanism of wage determination
on the labor market. For example, if too many ¯rms enter, the aggregate demand
for labor input is very large. If the number of potential workers is limited (e.g., the
population size is restricted), high labor demand drives wages up and pushes ¯rms'
expected value below the entry cost. This makes entry unpro¯table and discourages
potential start ups. On the contrary, if very few ¯rms enter, the wages are low and
¯rms' pro¯ts are high. In this case, the number of entering ¯rms increases until equality
is reached in the free entry condition (6).
Equation (6) plays the crucial role in analyzing the e®ects of labor market policies.
In particular, the larger the decrease in the left hand side of the free entry condition
generated by the introduction of the employment subsidy, the more ¯rms would have to
exit from the industry, and, as a consequence, aggregate employment may fall. This is
likely to happen if the distribution of entrants' productivity shocks is concentrated over
the relatively small values of s, because, as it has been shown in the previous Section,
the after-tax value of su±ciently small ¯rms decreases when the subsidy program is
implemented.
To describe formally the link between the aggregate labor demand and the °ow
of entrants, one has to characterize the law of motion of the distribution of ¯rms'
productivity shocks. Assume that by the end of period t the aggregate distribution
of ¯rms' productivity levels is described by the density function ¹t(S) (S is from the
Borel set of [0;s]), and ¸t+1 ¯rms decide to enter into the industry at the beginning of
11the period t + 1, then the distribution of ¯rms' productivity shocks ¹t+1 by the end of








The ¯rst term in the above expression describes how the distribution of existing ¯rms
changes from period t to period t+1 and accounts for those ¯rms who receive produc-
tivity shock s = 0 in period t and exit from the industry. The second term adds to it
the distribution of newcomers' productivity shocks.
ASSUMPTION 3 For every s 2 [0;s], there exist N ¸ 1 such that
QN(0js) > 0.
This assumption suggests that every ¯rm exits with positive probability within a ¯nite
number of periods. As a consequence of this assumption, it can be shown that every
¯rm's expected life-time is ¯nite. Precisely this condition is driving the existence of
stationary distribution of ¯rms' productivity shocks in the long run.
Lemma 3 If Q(s0js) satis¯es Assumptions 1-3, G(0) < 1 and ¸t = ¸ for all t ¸ 0,
then








(ii) if ¸1 = k¸, then ¹¸1 = k¹¸.
(Proof of this Lemma follows the line of argument in Hopenhayn (1993).)
In other words, the presence of an absorbing state guarantees the existence of unique
invariant distribution ¹¸ with a relatively limited number of assumptions. Intuitively,
the evolution of ¹t can be decomposed into two processes. On one hand, as time goes on,
more of those ¯rms that were present in the industry at time 0 exit. After su±ciently
many periods very few of them remain active, therefore the limiting distribution ¹¸
(if it exists) is not a®ected by the initial distribution ¹0. On the other hand, ¸ ¯rms
open up every period and at least some of them receive positive productivity shocks
(since G(0) < 1). This prevents the industry from dying out. The fact that every ¯rm's
expected life time is ¯nite guarantees that the distribution generated by the in°ow of
new ¯rms every period does not explode and converges to a ¯nite distribution ¹¸, as it
is stated in (i) of Lemma 3.
12Therefore, if the number of entrants ¸ and the distribution of their productivity














Before switching to a formal de¯nition of equilibrium allocations, it is useful to
formulate the following result describing the properties of the aggregate labor demand:
Lemma 4 Assume that all the conditions of Lemma 1 hold and Q(s0js) satis¯es As-








(ii) If, in addition, ° > 1¡®




The above lemma characterizes how aggregate demands for labor respond to changes
in the wage rates. Part (i) of Lemma 4 states an obvious result: if a wage for any type
of labor falls, ¯rms respond by hiring more workers of this type. The second result of
Lemma 4 is less obvious and is driven by the convexity of the training cost as a function
of the fraction of unskilled employees. In particular, part (ii) claims that a decrease
in the wage of unskilled workers not only stimulates the demand for unskilled labor
but also drives up the demand for skilled employees, thus creating a complementarity
between both types of workers.
Intuitively, in response to a decrease in wl, the ¯rm would primarily increase the
number of its unskilled workers. If, at the same time, the ¯rm does not adjust the
number of its skilled employees, the fraction nl=nh increases too fast. Since the training
cost is convex, this could imply that the ¯rm's expenditures on training grow faster
than its bene¯ts resulting from a fall in wl. Thus, in order to slow down the growth
of the marginal training cost, the ¯rm must also increase the number of its unskilled
employees.
Obviously, the above argument will apply only if the degree of convexity of the
training cost function is large enough, which is stipulated by additional condition
° > 1¡®
1¡wl=wh ¡ 1 that appears in the second part of Lemma 4. Note that the ¯rm's
productivity s does not enter this inequality, implying that the two types of labor are
substitutes in all incumbent ¯rms, independent of their size. Clearly, this condition
could be relaxed if certain properties are known about the distribution of ¯rms' pro-
ductivity shocks ¹¸. In particular, for every individual ¯rm the result of (ii) would hold
if its current fraction of unskilled workers nl=(nl + nh) is small enough (it is easy to
13verify that the last statement of Lemma 4 is always true if nl=(nl + nh) ! 0). How-
ever, even in its general form, condition ° > 1¡®
1¡wl=wh ¡ 1 is not too restrictive. For the
parameter values used in the numerical exercise in Section 4, this condition is weaker
than condition (3) required in Lemma 1.
Recalling that the assumption of convexity of training cost can be derived from the
assumption of on-the-job training provided by the skilled employees to their less skilled
colleagues, the second result of Lemma 4 becomes very intuitive: if a ¯rm increases the
number of employees requiring additional training, it must also hire more workers who
are able to provide this training, otherwise it incurs very large losses.
Such complementarity property is obviously an extreme case and is unlikely to ¯nd
strong support in the data. However, it turns out to be very helpful in conveying the
main argument of this paper: I show that even in the presence of such complemen-
tarity, the redistributional e®ect can revert the predictions of policy analysis. Lemma
4 implies that a reduction in the wage for unskilled workers would stimulate demand
for both types of employees, thus suggesting that the introduction of an employment
subsidy could potentially have a positive impact on total employment if the number of
entrants ¸ remains unchanged. However, this prediction may fail if ¸ is determined en-
dogenously because an increase in labor demand for skilled workers can be outweighed
by an endogenous decrease in the number of operating ¯rms arising due to pro¯t redis-
tribution from young to mature ¯rms. This mechanism is studied more carefully in the
following section.
3 Equilibrium Allocation and Policy Analysis
This section de¯nes an equilibrium allocation and explains why accounting for general
equilibrium e®ects arising due to endogeneity of the number of ¯rms in the economy
might have important implications for evaluating employment subsidy programs. The
analysis in the ¯rst part of this section does not specify how labor supply is generated
because the results formulated below hold for any increasing labor supply function.
However, a particular shape of labor supply has to be chosen if one wants to relate
the results to the data and analyze numerically the e®ects of targeted employment
subsidies. That is why the last part of this section presents one possible example of
endogenizing labor supply curves which explains how unemployment arises.
143.1 Stationary equilibrium allocation
Assume that the labor supply curves of both types of labor are given by the upward
sloping functions NS
h (wh) and NS
l (wl).11
De¯nition 1 Given production technology sf(¢), training cost function c(¢), law of mo-
tion of ¯rms' productivity shocks Q(s;S), distribution of shocks for entrants G(s), entry
cost ´, and workers' labor supply curves NS
h (wh) and NS
l (wl), a stationary recursive
competitive equilibrium with ¯xed entry is de¯ned by the value function V (s;wh;wl),
hiring policies nh(s;wh;wl) and nl(s;wh;wl), wages (wh;wl), the number of entrants ¸
and the distribution ¹¸ of ¯rms' productivity shocks such that:
(i) V (s;wh;wl) and ni(s;wh;wl), i = h;l solve the ¯rms' pro¯t maximization problem
(4);
(ii) wages wh and wl are such that labor markets for both types of employees clear:
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where the aggregate labor demand functions Nh(wh;wl;¸) and Nl(wh;wl;¸) are
de¯ned in (8) and (9);
(iii) ¹¸ is a stationary distribution of ¯rms' productivity levels generated by a constant
°ow of entrants ¸ as it is de¯ned in (7);
(iv) entry into the industry is competitive, i.e., the free entry condition (6) holds:
Z
V (s;wh;wl)dG(s) = ´:
In the remainder of the paper this equilibrium allocation is referred to as a free entry
equilibrium because it stipulates that the free entry condition is satis¯ed with equality.
Altogether, conditions (10) and (6) constitute a system of three equations with three
unknown aggregate variables { wages wh and wl, and the number of entrants ¸.
As an alternative to a free entry equilibrium, one could also consider an economy
where the total number of ¯rms is ¯xed endogenously, i.e., b ¸ is a parameter rather than
exogenous variable. In such an economy the free entry condition (6) would not neces-
sarily hold, while the conditions (i)-(iii) would still have to be satis¯ed in an equilibrium
11Note that in this simple speci¯cation, labor supply of one type of workers is independent of the
wage paid to another type of employees, suggesting that workers' types cannot change throughout their
lives. A more realistic framework should allow for transition between di®erent groups; in this case the
distributional e®ect could still be important, though the mechanism could be less transparent.
15allocation. For convenience, let us label such equilibrium allocation, characterized by
an exogenous parameter ¸, as a ¯xed entry equilibrium with b ¸ entrants.12
3.2 The e®ects of targeted employment subsidies
Consider the following policy experiment. Assume that the government subsidizes ¯rms
for hiring unskilled workers by compensating a fraction µ of these workers' wage wl.
Suppose that the government ¯nances these subsidy expenditures by levying a pro¯t
tax at a °at rate ¿. This means that ¯rms' cost of hiring an unskilled worker drops
to (1¡µ)wl, and, correspondingly, ¯rms' value V¿(s;wh;(1¡µ)wl) is now given by the
maximization problem (5). Note also that pro¯t tax ¯nancing does not a®ect ¯rms'
hiring policies because their labor decision is derived from the instantaneous pro¯t
maximization problem.13
In an equilibrium allocation, the government should determine tax and subsidy rates




¤(s;wh;(1 ¡ µ)wl)d¹¸(s) = µwl N
D
l (wh;(1 ¡ µ)wl;¸); (11)
where ¼¤(s;wh;(1 ¡ µ)wl) is the optimal value of ¯rms' instantaneous pro¯ts found in
(2) and ND
l (wh;(1 ¡ µ)wl;¸) is the function of ¯rms' aggregate demand for unskilled
labor de¯ned earlier in (9).
Such a government policy has the potential to reduce unemployment since, according
to (ii) of Lemma 4, it drives up individual ¯rms' demand for both types of labor. That
is why, after the subsidy program is implemented, the economy's employment should
increase if the total number of operating ¯rms remains unchanged, as happens in a
¯xed entry equilibrium. In contrast, in a free entry equilibrium, an endogenous change
in the number of ¯rms may outweigh an increase in individual ¯rms' demand. This
could happen if the new subsidy program crowds out some ¯rms from the industry by,
12In a general case, it is not possible to claim either existence or uniqueness of any of the de¯ned









which should always hold in the equilibrium due to (10), may generate a non-monotone relationship
between wl and wh for any given ¸. That is why in the numerical example in the last section of the
paper I choose such a set of parameters that the benchmark free entry equilibrium is unique, and then
I study the deviations around this equilibrium generated by the introduction of the subsidy program.
13This implication is not crucial for the analysis in this paper. Any other form of ¯nancing, e.g.,
payroll or output taxation, would lead to a redistribution e®ect as long as it is \spread" across all
¯rms. Adopting the assumption of pro¯t taxation makes the analysis more transparent.
16for example, inducing substantial redistribution of pro¯t from young to mature ¯rms.
The following Proposition formally states this intuitive result.
PROPOSITION 1 Assume that f(l) = l®, c(¢) is given by (1) and Q(s0js) satis¯es
Assumptions 1-3. Suppose also that labor supply curves NS
h (wh) and NS
l (wl) are upward
sloping. Then:
(A) in an economy with the ¯xed number of entering ¯rms b ¸, equilibrium wages, total
employment as well as employment rates of each group of workers rise after the
introduction of the subsidy program;
(B) in a free entry equilibrium, in which the number of entering ¯rms ¸ is determined
endogenously, the introduction of the subsidy program
(i) has an ambiguous e®ect on the number of entering ¯rms ¸ as well as on
unemployment rates and wages of each particular group of workers;
(iii) discourages entry if G(s¤) = 1 for some s¤ < s, i.e., if entrants are su±-
ciently small compared to mature ¯rms; in this case unemployment among
skilled workers rises.
In order to understand better the results of the above proposition, it is convenient
to analyze in the ¯rst place how the introduction of the employment subsidy a®ects the
value of the entrants in a ¯xed entry economy. Since the subsidy stimulates ¯rms' de-
mand for both types of workers, both wages would increase in a ¯xed entry equilibrium.
Depending on the elasticities of labor demand and supply functions, these increases can
be large or moderate. In any case, the value of the large ¯rms, who bene¯t from hiring
larger fractions of subsidized unskilled workers, goes up. However, if the accompany-
ing rise in the skilled workers' wage (driven by the large ¯rms' necessity to hire more
skilled workers in order to reduce marginal training cost) is substantial, the value of the
small ¯rms, who hire almost no unskilled labor, is likely to decrease. Therefore, even if
only due to complementarity of employees with di®erent skills, the introduction of the
subsidy program may induce a redistribution of pro¯ts from small to large ¯rms.
On top of it, a new pro¯t tax, imposed to ¯nance the subsidy payments, makes
this redistribution e®ect more pronounced. As it has been suggested by Lemmas 1 and
2, the large ¯rms' one-period gross pro¯t increases at a higher rate than the pro¯t of
small ¯rms, thus implying that the after-tax pro¯t of the smallest ¯rms falls, while
the large ¯rms' after-tax pro¯t might still be higher than in the benchmark economy.
Correspondingly, if the entrants are su±ciently small, the introduction of the targeted
employment subsidies would necessarily reduce the entrants' value, thus triggering the
exit of ¯rms from the industry. As ¯rms exit, the aggregate demand levels for both
types of workers decrease, thereby causing the drop in wages wl and wh below their
17levels in a subsidized ¯xed entry equilibrium. This generates a decrease in corresponding
employment levels, thereby making the total e®ect of the subsidy ambiguous. Obviously,
a simple intuitive argument also suggests that if the subsidy level is quite high, a
large fraction of ¯rms would experience a decrease in the after-tax pro¯t in the ¯xed
entry equilibrium. This would discourage many ¯rms from entering the industry, and,
correspondingly, total employment would be likely to drop after the introduction of a
subsidy.
Finally, it is also important to notice that the fall in the number of entering ¯rms
should not necessarily be driven by a pro¯t redistribution from young to mature ¯rms,
but may also arise due to a distortionary e®ect of the employment subsidies.14
3.3 Workers' labor supply: an example
The following section presents one possible way of endogenizing the relationship be-
tween workers' wages and unemployment rates. It uses a simple version of the Shapiro-
Stiglitz shirking model to derive the functions NS
h (wh) and NS
l (wl) and shows that both
functions are strictly increasing, as it is required in Proposition 1.
Suppose that at any period of time a worker can be employed by at most one ¯rm.
Within a period, the employer does not observe worker's e®ort level. However, in the
end of the period the employer is able to monitor the amount of e®ective labor supplied
by his employee. It is commonly known that workers' e®ective labor supply is correlated
with the worker's e®ort level: if the employee exerts full e®ort his e®ective labor supply
is equal to 1 with probability q > 0, but if the worker shirks he supplies zero units of
e®ective labor.
Each period the worker and the employer sign a contract, which speci¯es the wage
wi (i = h;l) that the worker receives independent of his realized productivity and a
punishment for supplying zero units of e®ective labor. If this happens, the worker loses
his/her job, earns a bad reputation and remains unemployed in the following period.
In future periods he would be reemployed with probability ¸i, in which case he would
be treated similarly to the employees with a good employment history. Therefore, as
in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, in this framework unemployment serves as a disciplining
14This argument is best illustrated by analyzing the response to the subsidy program in an industry
with homogeneous ¯rms. In the absence of frictions, the economy's welfare, measured as a sum of ¯rms'
and workers' total surplus, decreases after the introduction of distortionary employment subsidies. In a
¯xed entry equilibrium, due to an increase in wages and employment levels of both types of employees,
the workers' total surplus rises. Correspondingly, ¯rms' surplus decreases after the new government
policy is implemented. Since the entrants' value coincides with the average incumbent's value in the
homogenous industry, some ¯rms would necessarily exit after the subsidy is introduced. This is not
necessarily true if the ¯rms are heterogeneous because in that case the value of the average operating
¯rm exceeds the value of the entrants due to an obvious selection e®ect.
18device that is necessary to prevent workers from shirking.15
Workers are risk-neutral and their disutility from exerting a full e®ort level is equal
to b. Naturally, due to risk neutrality, workers discount future income at the same rate
¯ as ¯rms do. Denote by V i
E, V i
S and V i
B values of (i) being employed and exerting full
e®ort; (ii) being employed and shirking; (iii) being unemployed due to having a bad




E = wi ¡ b + ¯[q V
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If the employment contract is designed properly, workers never decide to shirk, i.e., the
incentive constraint V i
E ¸ V i





B) ¸ b: (13)
Obviously, in a competitive labor market the incentive constraint should be satis¯ed




(1 + ¯¸i): (14)
In the steady state, ¸i determines the unemployment rate ui among i¡type workers.
Recalling that only workers with a bad reputation experience di±culties ¯nding a new
job after being ¯red, it is obvious that
1 ¡ ui = (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ui) + ¸iui: (15)
Together with (14), the above equation implies that
ui =
¯(1 ¡ q)
¯q wi=b ¡ 1 + ¯(1 ¡ q)
: (16)
Correspondingly, the total employment level of the workers of type i is equal to
N
S




¯q wi=b ¡ 1 + ¯(1 ¡ q)
¶
; i = l;h; (17)
15In contrast to the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, I add a reputational aspect into the employment contract
because it is important to distinguish between ¯ring due to bad performance and separation due to a
decrease in the ¯rm's optimal size (caused by a decline in the ¯rm's productivity). If no such distinction
were made, contracts would vary across ¯rms with di®erent productivity shocks, thus generating across-
¯rms wage di®erentials. Though potentially interesting, such framework would complicate the analysis
in this paper and shift the focus away from the paper's main subject.
19where Ni is the total number of workers of type i living in the economy. Note that
NS
i (wi) is a strictly increasing function, as was required in Proposition 1. In addition,
(17) implies that the unemployment rate among unskilled workers is higher than the
unemployment rate among skilled workers because condition wh > wl is necessary to
generate positive demand for unskilled labor.
Finally, it is also necessary to account for the fact that a fraction 1 ¡ q of ¯rms'
employees fail to supply any e®ective labor. This is easily corrected by modifying ¯rms'
production function in the following way:
e f(l) = f(ql):
Since such transformation preserves all the stipulated above properties of the production
function, all the preceding results remain valid for e f(l).
4 Numerical Analysis
This section presents the results of a simulation exercise illustrating that while eval-
uating the expected policy's outcomes it is important to take into consideration the
structure of the production sector. First, it might be crucial to account for a potential
change in the number of operating ¯rms if the entry into the industry is competitive.
Second, heterogeneity between young and mature ¯rms is also likely to play an impor-
tant role in policy analysis because it can aggravate the policy's adverse e®ect on the
number of existing ¯rms. The numerical example below shows that overlooking any
of these two aspects may generate wrong predictions about the expected e®ects of the
subsidy program.
4.1 Calibration procedure
The ¯rst part of this section describes the calibration procedure. The parameter values
are chosen in such a way that the properties of the free-entry equilibrium allocation are
consistent with the data on ¯rms' growth and survival, amount of employer-provided
training as well as the distribution of workers' wages and unemployment rates. Table
1 lists all the exogenous parameters of the model together with the data sources that
are used to pin down the parameters' values.
A time period is equal to one year, thus the time preference rate is set to ¯ =
1=(1 + r) = 0:9524, where r = 0:05 stands for the annual interest rate. In order to
set the parameters of the labor supply functions, I use the relationship (16) between
the workers' wage and unemployment rates, wi and ui, so that their equilibrium values
match the distribution of wages and unemployment levels across workers with di®erent
skills.
20The parameters of the model
Parameter Value Data to match
Time preference rate, ¯ 0.9524 annual interest rate
Probability of supplying 0.9734 distribution of wages
full labor, q and unemployment rates
Curvature of f(l), ® 0.64 labor share of output
Multipl. of the training cost function, A 0.1352 per employee training
Curv. of the training cost function, ° 0.8249 per employee training
Per employee hrs of training, » 30.5 ratio of empl. levels
Vector of prod. shocks, s see Table 3 grid of ¯rm sizes
Transition matrix, Q see Table 3 ¯rms' growth and exit
Distr. of entrants' shocks, G see Table 3 size distr. of ¯rms
Entry cost, ´ 101.6 average ¯rm size
Table 1: The parameters of the model
21Nickell and Bell (1996) classify US workers into two groups, those with high and
low education, and report that: (i) the wages of more educated workers are 1.51 times
higher than the wages of workers with relatively low education; (ii) unemployment rates
among workers with high and low education are equal to 3% and 11% respectively; (iii)
the average unemployment rate is equal to 6%,16. Normalizing b = 1 and using (16)
it is easy to derive that q = 0:9734 would generate the equilibrium unemployment
rates consistent with the above observations. For this value of q, the equilibrium wages
should be equal to wh = 1:96 and wl = 1:3.17
To set the parameters of the training cost function I use the data on per employee
hours of employer provided training collected by the survey Sept95 of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics for the Employer Training Administration of the U.S. Department of
Labor. The ¯fth row of Table 2 reports the amount h(l) of per employee training (in
hours) for ¯rms of various sizes. Note that, consistently with the results presented in
Section 2, large ¯rms provide more per worker training than small ¯rms.
In terms of the model's setup, the number of training hours per employee is pro-
portionate to the fraction of unskilled workers nl=(nl + nh) hired by the ¯rm. The
coe±cient of proportionality (denote it by »), indicating how many hours of training
an unskilled worker must receive, would then be determined by aggregating the total
number of unskilled workers across all ¯rms and matching it with the relative amount
of unskilled population that is employed in the equilibrium.
For every given », the parameters A and ° of the training cost function can be
chosen to minimize the di®erence between h(l) reported in the ¯fth row of Table 2
and the optimal number of training hours »nl(l;A;°)=l derived endogenously from the
¯rms' pro¯t maximization problem:18
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The expression in the right hand side of the above equality is computed on the grid of
¯rms' sizes l, and h(l) taken from Table 2.
In turn, » is chosen to match the fraction of high skilled workers employed in the















16Correspondingly, 37:5% of the total population have low education and the ratio of employed
skilled to unskilled workers is equal to 1:82
17These levels of q, wh and wl are the unique solution to a system of equations given by (16) written
for i = h and i = l together with the condition wh = 1:51wl.
18The optimal number of unskilled employees nl(l;A;°) is a solution to the ¯rst order condition to
(2) with respect to nl.
22Firms in US manufacturing
Number of employees1, l 0-49 50-99 100-249 250-499 ¸ 500
Data:
Fraction of ¯rms2, ¹ 0.70 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.03
Growth rates of survivors3 0.391 0.130 0.077 0.026 -
Firm exit rates 0.379 0.346 0.291 0.191 -
Hours of training4, h(l) 3.34 8.2 11.39 14.56 16.6
Model:
Fraction of ¯rms 0.391 0.130 0.077 0.026 -
Growth rates of survivors 0.391 0.130 0.077 0.026 -
Firm exit rates 0.379 0.346 0.291 0.191 -
Hours of training, »nl(l)=l 3.15 7.49 11.33 14.72 16.66
Notes:
1In the numerical exercise it is assumed that ¯rms' productivity shocks can take six
possible values, so that the corresponding employment levels fall in the middle of
these size intervals, l = [25;75;175;375;600].
2Source: Veracierto (2000), Table 2.
3Source: This and the next row are taken from Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989).
4Source: Frazis, Gittleman, Horrigan and Joyce (1998), Table 3, Column 4. Originally
the data are reported for ¯rms with more than 50 employees, so the ¯rst number in
this row is obtained by extrapolation on the smaller levels of ¯rms' size under the
assumption that ¯rms with zero employees provide no training.
Table 2: Firms in US manufacturing
23where f¹ig stands for the observed in the data size distribution of ¯rms (reported in the
third row of Table 2), and the last number is taken from the estimations of Nickell and
Bell. (1996)19 It is easy to verify that the second term in the above equality is increasing
in » if »nl(l;A;°)=l approximates h(l) well enough. Thus » is well determined by the
condition (19).
Therefore, using (18) and (19), I ¯nd that ° = 0:8249, A = 0:1352 and » = 30:5
produce the best (in terms of (18)) approximation of the training function if the equilib-
rium wages are equal to wh = 1:96 and wl = 1:3.20 The corresponding optimal training
hours derived from the model are reported in the last row of Table 2.
Further, the vector of ¯rms' productivity shocks s is ¯xed in such a way that the
grid vector of ¯rms' possible sizes l is derived endogenously from ¯rms' maximization
problem (i.e., it solves the ¯rst order condition to (2) with respect to l). Then the
empirical evidence on ¯rms' growth and exit rates (summarized in the third and forth
rows of Table 2) is used to set the values of the transition matrix Q. In turn, the dis-
tribution of entrants' productivity shocks is determined as a solution to (7), where the
equilibrium size distribution f¹ig of ¯rms is taken from the data.21 The corresponding
values of the productivity shocks, the transition matrix Q and the distribution of en-
trants G are reported in Table 3. Chosen in this way G implies that all the entrants,
who account for 35% of all incumbent ¯rms, are responsible for 19% of total industry's
output (Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) report this number being equal to 15:2%
in US manufacturing). This means that, on average, entrants are signi¯cantly smaller
than older ¯rms: in the model the average entrants' number of employees constitutes
only 32% of the average employment of incumbent ¯rms.
At the last stage, the entry cost ´ is set to satisfy the free entry condition given that
the equilibrium wages coincide with the obtained earlier values wh = 1:96 and wl = 1:3.
In the economy with the parameter levels de¯ned above, the entry cost ´ is equal to
100.6, which constitutes 29% of the value of the average incumbent ¯rm.
Finally, it has been veri¯ed that for the parameter values listed in Table 1 the
economy has unique free entry equilibrium, i.e., the system of equations (10) and (6)
has a unique solution bundle (wh;wl;¸). To summarize, in this equilibrium allocation,
the average economy's unemployment rate is equal to 6%, with unemployment rates
among skilled and unskilled workers being equal to 3% and 11% respectively. The
19See footnote 15.
20These computations are made for the production function f(l) = l®, in which ® = 0:64 corresponds
to the labor share of output. It is easy to see from the ¯rst order conditions to the ¯rm's problem that
the total ¯rm's expenditures on workers' wages are equal to whl¡(wh ¡wl)nl = sf0(l)l = ®f(l). Note
that for this pair (®;°) the second statement of Lemma 4 holds as long as wl=wh · 0:80 (while in the
benchmark equilibrium allocation wl=wh = 0:66).
21As it has been noted before, ¹¸ is homogenous of degree 1 in ¸, thus implying that the entrants'



















1:0000 0 0 0 0 0
0:3796 0:5362 0:0655 0:0186 0 0
0:3460 0:0046 0:6213 0:0092 0:0190 0
0:2910 0 0:0081 0:6594 0:0324 0:0091
0:1910 0 0 0:0029 0:7685 0:0376






Table 3: Values of ¯rms' productivity shocks, distribution of shocks for entrants and
transition matrix for incumbents.
25Figure 2: Comparison of the e®ects of targeted employment subsidies on average un-
employment and the number of operating ¯rms in the free entry ( { ) and ¯xed entry
( { { ) economies.
skilled workers' wage is 1.51 times higher than the wage of their unskilled colleagues.
The average incumbent ¯rm hires 76 workers, while the average entering ¯rm employs
24 workers (32% of the incumbent ¯rm's size). The equilibrium distribution of ¯rms
and their growth and survival rates coincide precisely with the data reported in the
upper part of Table 2. The hours of employer-provided training derived in the model
for di®erent ¯rm sizes are also listed in Table 2. As can be noticed, they approximate
very well their empirical counterpart. When measured in terms of ¯rms' output, the
smallest and the largest ¯rms spend respectively 1:1% and 3:6% of their total revenue
on their own employees' training.
4.2 Policy analysis: the role of competitive entry
This section compares the e®ects of targeted employment subsidies on equilibrium allo-
cations in ¯xed entry and free entry economies. Suppose that in the absence of subsidies
the two equilibria are identical and all their endogenous variables coincide with those
of the benchmark economy calibrated in the previous section. Now assume that the
government subsidizes a fraction µ of unskilled workers' wage. Figure 2 illustrates the
most important di®erences in the two economies' responses to such a subsidy program.
It plots the stationary equilibrium levels of the average unemployment rates and the
number of operating ¯rms for di®erent levels of subsidies. The results for the free entry
equilibrium are plotted with a solid line.
In a ¯xed entry equilibrium, the number of ¯rms is ¯xed exogenously at a given level
(normalized to 1), thus the dashed line on the right panel of Figure 2 is completely °at.
In contrast, the number of ¯rms in a free entry equilibrium adjusts as the subsidy rate
varies: the bigger the subsidy rate, the fewer the ¯rms operating in the industry because
the increased tax pressure reduces the value of entrants and discourages start ups.
More striking is the di®erence in the behavior of average unemployment rates in
the two economies illustrated in the upper left panel of Figure 2. In a ¯xed entry equi-
librium, the fraction of the economy's employed population increases as the subsidy
rate rises. However, once we account for a general equilibrium e®ect arising due to
endogeneity of the number of ¯rms, the relationship between the subsidy rate and the
unemployment level becomes non-monotone. A relatively small subsidy rate stimulates
labor demand and has a positive e®ect on the economy's employment. However, as the
subsidy becomes su±ciently large (more than 30%), it has an adverse e®ect on the value
of entrants, is accompanied by a massive exit of ¯rms, and as a result it drives up the
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Figure 3: Comparison of the e®ects of targeted employment subsidies on unemployment
rates and wages in the free entry ( { ) and ¯xed entry ( { { ) economies.
average unemployment rate above its value in the benchmark economy. Correspond-
ingly, there exists a level of subsidy which minimizes the aggregate unemployment rate.
In this economy it is equal to 17% and it reduces average unemployment from 6% to
5%.
Figure 3 provides a more detailed characterization of the economy's response to the
targeted employment subsidy program. It explains the described above di®erences in
the behavior of unemployment rates by illustrating how the new policy a®ects wage and
unemployment rates of each group of workers. First, in accordance with (ii) of Lemma
4, wages and employment levels of both types of workers rise after the introduction of
the subsidies because the number of ¯rms in the economy remains una®ected and, at
each individual ¯rm's level, skilled and unskilled workers serve as complementary labor
inputs.
27At the same time, in a ¯xed entry equilibrium the increased tax pressure pushes
the after-tax value of entrants below the level of the entry cost ´. That is why in a
free entry equilibrium both wage levels should decrease compared to their values in the
¯xed entry allocation in order to balance the free entry condition. More formally, such
wage reduction is driven by the decrease in the aggregate labor demand stipulated by
the exit of ¯rms. After equality in the free entry condition is established, the wage
of skilled workers falls below its benchmark level (correspondingly, the unemployment
rate of skilled workers rises), but the wage of unskilled workers still remains above its
level in a non subsidized economy. Therefore, even though the two labor types are
complementary from the viewpoint of every individual ¯rm, they become substitutes at
the aggregate level: the targeted employment subsidy program stimulates labor demand
for unskilled workers, but the total demand for skilled employees decreases due to a fall
in the number of operating ¯rms.22
4.3 Policy analysis: the role of the relative size of the entrants
As it has been already mentioned in Section 3, the number of ¯rms in the industry
with competitive entry may drop for two reasons: either because the subsidy program
induces redistribution of pro¯ts from smaller (younger) to larger (more mature) ¯rms
or because the subsidy expenditures are ¯nanced via distortionary taxation. In order
to evaluate how important the former redistribution e®ect is, this section compares the
previously studied outcomes of the subsidy program with the e®ects of the subsidies
generated in a new economy, which di®ers from the benchmark only in the relative size
of entering ¯rms.
More formally, in the latter economy ¯rms have the same production and training
technology, and their productivity shocks follow the same Markov process as in the
benchmark economy, but the distribution of entrants' productivity shocks b G(s) is such
that the relative size of entrants in the modi¯ed economy is larger than in the the
benchmark. In this numerical example, the entrants employ 41% fewer workers than
the incumbent ¯rms do, while in the benchmark economy this di®erence was as large
as 68%. Obviously, the di®erence in the distribution of entrants' productivity shocks
22Note that the free entry condition dictates a necessary change in wages. Obviously, the size of the
associated decrease in the employment rates must depend on the wage elasticity of labor supply ". In
the benchmark economy, the wage elasticity is quite small; it is equal to 0.066. In order to study the
e®ects of wage elasticity on the equilibrium allocation in a subsidized economy, it would be necessary
to depart from the Shapiro-Stiglitz story described in Section 3.4 and to assume that labor supply is
given by, for example, a CES function NS
i (wi) = Aiw"
iNi. From such numerical exercise I ¯nd that,
other things equal, higher wage elasticity is associated with higher unemployment rates at all subsidy
levels. In particular, as " changes from 0.05 to 1.5 (empirical estimates usually come up with a number
within this interval; see, for instance, Chetty (2003) for a review of empirical studies), the subsidy rate
that maximizes total employment in the economy varies from 0.14 to 0.08.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the e®ects of targeted employment subsidies in the economies
with small ( { ) and large ( { ¢ { ) entrants.
29also implies that the long run distribution b ¹¸ di®ers from ¹¸. However, the new entry
cost ´ is chosen so that the benchmark equilibrium wages wh = 1:96 and wl = 1:30
are also consistent with the free entry equilibrium in the new economy. That is why
the corresponding unemployment rates coincide in the two economies in the absence of
subsidies.
Figure 5 compares the e®ects of the targeted employment subsidies for both economies
(the results for the benchmark economy are plotted with the solid line). It turns out
that in the economy with relatively large entrants the same subsidy rate induces fewer
¯rms to exit. For instance, a 17% employment subsidy crowds out 18% of ¯rms in the
modi¯ed economy as opposed to 28% in the benchmark economy. Correspondingly, all
unemployment rates are lower in the new economy: when the average unemployment
rate reaches its minimum of 5% in the benchmark economy, the average unemployment
level in the modi¯ed economy becomes equal to 4:6%.23 Notably, the total e®ect on
employment is still positive and signi¯cant at quite high subsidy levels, which generate
a fall in the average economy's employment in the benchmark economy.24
5 Final Remarks
Empirical studies document that large ¯rms provide more training per employee and
hire more subsidized workers (measured as a fraction of ¯rms' labor force) than small
¯rms do. At the same time, ¯rm dynamics literature provides broad evidence of the
positive relationship between ¯rms' size and age. These ¯ndings suggest that large and
mature ¯rms bene¯t from the introduction of targeted employment subsidies, while
small and young establishments may incur indirect costs. The theoretical analysis
in this paper argues that such redistribution of pro¯t from young to mature ¯rms
might decrease the value of entrants, discourage start ups and weaken the e®ects of
new government policy. A numerical exercise in the last section illustrates that the
resulting exit of ¯rms can even revert the expected policy outcomes.
In particular, if a policymaker believes that the employment subsidy program does
not a®ect the number of operating ¯rms or if he does not take into account the large
heterogeneity between young and mature ¯rms observed in the data, he would expect
that a 30% subsidy for hiring unskilled workers should have a positive impact on to-
tal employment. However, in the modeled economy, this subsidy rate would actually
decrease the total employment level if one accounts for endogeneity of the number of
23It reaches its minimum of 4:4% at the rate µ = 0:26.
24Similar patterns are preserved if either the endogenous tax rate or the cost of the subsidy program
(measured as a fraction of total labor income) are plotted on the horizontal axis of the graphs on
Figure 5. Having a look at such representation might be interesting because these two variables are
directly related to the size of the distortionary e®ect.
30operating ¯rms as well as the realistic di®erences between young and mature ¯rms. In
addition, the simulation exercise presented in this paper shows that the relationship be-
tween the economy's employment and subsidy rate is not monotone and that the same
subsidy rate would generate more employment as the degree of heterogeneity between
young and mature ¯rms increases.
In general, the main argument presented in this work is not speci¯c to the targeted
employment subsidy programs, but could be applied to many other policies that are
likely to have di®erent impacts on the ¯rms of di®erent ages (¯ring taxes, start-up
subsidies, etc.). Obviously, the general equilibrium e®ect described in this paper would
be important only if a policy is implemented on a large scale (e.g., industry or economy
level). For instance, in the numerical example discussed above the targeted group of
workers is quite large, constituting about 35% of the population. If the size of this
group were much smaller, no signi¯cant e®ect on total employment would be observed.
A large number of empirical and theoretical studies discuss the sizes of substitution
and replacement e®ects associated with the introduction of various subsidy programs.
The goal of these works is to ¯nd out whether these programs create incentives for
¯rms to ¯re their regular workforce and hire instead subsidized workers. Traditionally,
the replacement e®ects are evaluated by looking at the individual ¯rms' decisions. This
paper describes a replacement mechanism that cannot be traced at the individual ¯rms'
level. In response to the introduction of subsidies, an average ¯rm in the industry
hires more workers of each type. However, the total employment level of the skilled
population may drop due to an endogenous decrease in the number of operating ¯rms.
Such aggregate replacement e®ect is likely to get bigger as the heterogeneity between
young and mature ¯rms gets more pronounced. From the econometric point of view, this
observation suggests that (i) a structural general equilibrium model would produce a
more accurate estimate of the replacement e®ects than a reduced-form approach and (ii)
some measure of heterogeneity between young and mature ¯rms could be an important
explanatory variable while estimating the e®ects of employment subsidy programs.
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fsf(l) ¡ wh(l ¡ nl) ¡ wlnl ¡ c(nl;l ¡ nl)g: (20)
To save on notations, denote the expression in the brackets on the right hand side of
(20) by ¼(l;nl). Then, if c(nl;l ¡ nl) is given by (1), the ¯rst order conditions for the
pro¯t maximization problem (20) can be written as
(l) : ¼1(l;nl) = sf
0(l) ¡ wh + (1 + °)
n1+°
A1+°(l ¡ nl)2+° = 0;
(nl) : ¼2(l;nl) = wh ¡ wl ¡ (1 + °)
n°l
A1+°(l ¡ nl)2+° = 0:
(21)





(1 ¡ nl=l)2+°: (22)
The right hand side of the above equation is increasing in nl=l, so ¯rm size and fraction
of unskilled workers among its employees are positively related.
Substituting (22) into the ¯rst equation in (21) results in
sf




Equations (22) and (23) form a system of equations with two unknowns, l and x =
nl
l 2 [0;1]. Each of these two equations implicitly de¯nes an increasing relationship
between l and x. Denote these two relationships correspondingly by l1(x) and l2(x).
Since l1(0) < l2(0) and limx!1 l1(x) > l2(1), the system of equations has at least one
solution. In order to establish its uniqueness, it is enough to show that l0
1(x) > l0
2(x)
for all x 2 (0;1). Di®erentiating (22) and (23) with respect to x implies that
l
0











2(x) if and only if






As x ! 0 or x ! 1, the above inequality holds for any concave function f(l). One way
to ensure that the inequality (25) also holds for all x 2 (0;1) is to establish monotonicity
35of the expression in the left hand side. In a general case, a certain relationship between
° and f(3)(l)l=f(2)(l) could be imposed. However, a simpler condition can be derived










where the last equality is obtained using (23). Substituting (26) in (25) and di®erenti-








suggesting that the curvature of the training cost c(l;l ¡ nl) must be su±ciently high
in order to ensure the uniqueness of the solution to (22) and (23).
The next step is to verify that the second order conditions are satis¯ed. The second
order partial derivatives of ¼(l;nl) are given by
¼11(l;nl) = sf












¼12(l;nl) = (wh ¡ wl)
1
l




The solution to (22) and (23) is a local maximum if ¼11(l;nl)¼22(l;nl)¡(¼12(l;nl))2 ¸ 0.
Substituting (27) into the left hand side of the latter inequality, it is easy to derive that
the second order conditions are satis¯ed if and only if the inequality (25) holds.




1¡® , the pro¯t maximization problem (20)
has a unique interior solution (n¤
l(s;wh;wl);l¤(s;wh;wl)). This proves (i) of Lemma 1.
In addition, (22) and (23) imply that @l¤(s;wh;wl)=@s > 0, which, combined with
the positive relationship between l and nl=l derived from (22), proves (ii) of Lemma 1.
In order to show that (iii) holds, it is enough to prove that
@2pi¤(s;wh;wl)
@wl@s < 0 (since
@¼¤(s;wh;wl)
@wl < 0). Substituting (23) into the expression for pro¯t implies that
¼
¤(s;wh;wl) = sf(l) ¡ slf
0(l) ¡ c(nl;l):
Di®erentiating it with respect to s we obtain that
@¼¤(s;wh;wl)
@s



























Substituting the above expression into (28) implies that
@¼¤(s;wh;wl)
@s = f(l). Then
@2¼¤(s;wh;wl)
@s@wl = f0(l) @l
@wl, which is less than zero if and only if @l
@wl < 0.
In order to determine the sign of @l























Solving the above system of equations we obtain
@l
@wl






























1¡® stipulates that @2¼¤(s;wh;wl)=@wl@s < 0, which proves (iii) of
Lemma 1.
Finally, it is straightforward to see that lims!0
@2¼¤(s;wh;wl)
@wl@s = 0, which implies (iv)
of Lemma 1.
Q:E:D
Proof of Lemma 2. By the Blackwell Su±cient Condition, the functional oper-
ator in the right hand side of the Bellman equation (4) is a contraction and thus, by
Contraction Mapping Theorem, (4) has a unique solution V (s;wh;wl). A standard re-
cursive argument, together with Assumption 1 implies that V (s;wh;wl) is a continuous
and increasing function in s.
Since s = 0 is an absorbing state, lims!0
R
V (s0;wh;wl)Q(s;ds0) = V (0;wh;wl).
Therefore, V (0;wh;wl) = ¼¤(0;wh;wl) + 1
1+r maxf0;V (0;wh;wl)g, which implies that
V (0;wh;wl) = 0. By monotonicity of V (s;wh;wl) in its ¯rst argument,
V (s;wh;wl) ¸ ¼
¤(s;wh;wl) + 0 > 0;
for all s > 0. This completes the proof of (i) of Lemma 2.
Note that
R
V (s0;wh;wl)Q(s;ds0) > 0 for all s > 0, thus for any positive s (4) can be
rewritten as








37Di®erentiating (31) with respect to wl, applying monotonicity of Q(s;S) and using
(iii) of Lemma 1, veri¯es (ii) of Lemma 2 in a straightforward way. In addition, from
Assumptions 1 and 2, combined with lims!0
@2¼¤(s;wh;wl)
@s@wl = 0 it follows that (iii) of
Lemma 2 holds.
Finally, it is easy to see that the value function V¿(s;wh;wl) = (1¡¿)V (s;wh;wl) solves





= (1 ¡ ¿)lim
s!0
V (s;wh;wl ¡ ¢)
V (s;wh;wl)
= 1 ¡ ¿ < 1:
Employing continuity and monotonicity of both V (s;wh;wl) and V¿(s;wh;wl) allows us
to conclude that (iv) of Lemma 2 holds.
Q:E:D
Proof of Lemma 4. Since wl and wh have no impact on the shape of the stationary
distribution ¹¸, it is enough to show that similar properties hold for the individual ¯rms'
hiring policies. The structure in the proof is reminiscent with the one used in the proof
of (iii) in the ¯rst Lemma: di®erentiating (22) and (23) with respect to wh (or wl)
produces the system of two equations with two unknown partial derivatives. Solving











where x = nl=l. Equations (22) and (23) have been already di®erentiated with respect
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Rearranging the terms on the right hand side of the above expression and using in-
equality (25), which has been established earlier as a necessary condition for @l
@wl < 0,
one easily derives that
@nl
@wl < 0 if and only if




Concavity of f(l) implies that the above inequality is always true. Thus
@nl
@wl < 0 holds




38In order to prove the second part of the statement (i) of Lemma 4, di®erentiate (22)

































(° + x)(1 ¡ x +
sf00(l)l











As it has been shown earlier, the denominator of the right hand side is negative since
@l
@wl < 0. Thus
@nl
@wl is negative if and only if the numerator on the right hand side
is positive. One can easily verify that this is true by rearranging the terms of the
nominator and showing that it collapses to a positive expression, °(1 ¡ x) ¡ x
sf00(l)l
wh¡wl.




@wl(1 ¡ x) ¡ @x
@wll. Substitute into this equation the expressions for










¶ 1 ¡ x +
sf00(l)l
wh¡wl









Rearranging the terms in the above equation and using the inequality (25) we conclude
that @nh=@wl < 0 if and only if








1+°. Therefore, (ii) of Lemma 3 is also veri¯ed.
Q:E:D
Proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward and is summarized in the discussion
following the proposition.
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